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Commercial Law
INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
In a well-reasoned opinion in Rogillio v. Cazedessus' the court
dealt at length with the problem of permittees and the coverage
afforded with respect to non-owned automobiles under the
standard family automobile policy. It was concluded (1) that
a son is a "relative" who is made expressly an insured with
reference to a non-owned automobile, and (2) that only the
named insured as defined in the policy, that is, the person named
in the policy as insured, and his spouse, have the authority to
constitute another a permittee. In consequence of these find-
ings, the insurers of the son's father were held bound to pay
for a loss occasioned by the son's negligent use of an automobile
belonging to a friend. At the same time, it was held that the
insurer of the friend's automobile was not responsible inasmuch
as the driver was not a permittee of the named insured, although
a limited use of it may have been authorized by the friend's
son. An earlier decision by the court of appeal was distin-
guished on the ground that since in that case the operator of
the car was subject to the immediate direction and control of
the authorized permittee, the car was, in effect, being operated
by the latter. In a concurring opinion, Judge Sanders analogized
the case to one involving a deviation by an omnibus insured and
expressed the view that permission by the named insured to a
second operator may be implied from the grant of permission to
the first. He found no basis for such an implication in the in-
stant case because the second operator had not been licensed to
drive an automobile.
In Fuililove v. United States Casualty Co.2 the court inter-
preted for the first time in this state the definition of a "tem-
porary substitute automobile" in the family automobile policy.
In a Note in a previous issue of this Law Review, the author
suggests that the interpretation adopted by the court is too re-
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 241 La. 186, 127 So.2d 734 (1961).
2. 240 La. 859, 125 So.2d 389 (1961), 21 LOUISIANA LAw R ViEw 835
(1961).
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strictive and has the effect of converting the policy term "normal
use" to "use." It is there observed that the policy does not re-
quire a withdrawal from "use" but rather from "normal use,"
which presupposes some continuation in use of the automobile
described in the policy on a limited basis.
In another interesting case, Ducote, d/b/a Orleans Tile Works
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,8 the court was called
upon to determine the meaning of "theft," "malicious mischief,"
and "vandalism" as used in a comprehensive coverage provision
of an automobile policy. An employee wrongfully removed his
employer's truck from a building in which it was kept over the
weekend to use it for his own pleasure. Later he damaged the
truck by running into a parked vehicle. When claim was made
by the employer against the insured, the former contended that
he was entitled to recover for the loss since the policy covered
loss by theft, malicious mischief, and vandalism, although it did
not cover loss by collision. The court found it improper to apply
the Criminal Code definition of "theft" to the policy provision
because there was no intent to deprive the employer permanently
of the vehicle. It also rejected the contention that the loss re-
sulted from "malicious mischief" on the ground that there was
no wilful injury to the property motivated by ill will or resent-
ment. It concluded, finally, that "vandalism" denotes "wilful,
wanton, or ruthless acts intended to damage or destroy prop-
erty." The court's construction of these terms seems to be clearly
in accord with what the ordinary purchaser of such protection
would understand by them, which the court has heretofore in-
dicated is the ultimate test.
In Grand v. American General Insurance Co.4 it was held
that the domicile of a foreign insurer for purposes of suit under
the Louisiana direct action provision of the Insurance Code is
the Parish of East Baton Rouge, the domicile of the Secretary
of State, its agent for service of process. "Domicile," as used
in the statute, was treated as synonymous with "residence."
This holding seems to be in complete harmony with the purpose
of the legislation in question.
3. 241 La. 677, 130 So.2d 649 (1961).
4. 241 La. 745, 131 So.2d 46 (1961).
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